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Zero and the Rise of
Technological Lawmaking
Max Stul Oppenheimer*
I.

Introduction

If a tree falls in Cambridge, Massachusetts and there is no
one nearby to hear it, but it is detected by a supersensitive
monitor near a hospital in Princeton, New Jersey, does it make
a sound? If so, does that sound violate a Princeton ordinance
that prohibits making a “detectable sound” in a hospital zone?
The interpretation of such an ordinance is committed to
the judiciary; the creation of new laws is committed to the
legislature and the judiciary. Although there is legislative
power to delegate certain aspects of this authority, it is
circumscribed, both by the Constitution and the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).
A third mechanism for changing law emerged without
fanfare in the middle of the twentieth century and has taken
on increasing importance as the pace of technological
development accelerates: advances in technology may change
the meaning of a law even though the words of a statute
remain unchanged. A vehicle law which limits vehicle speeds to
miles per hour (“mph”) depends on the definitions of miles and
of hour, both of which have undergone change since the first
vehicle speed limits were adopted in the early twentieth
century. An environmental law which limits “detectible
emissions” depends on the sensitivity of available detection
equipment, a characteristic which has changed since the first
modern environmental laws were adopted in the mid-twentieth
century.
This technological development is not overseen by any
government entity, yet it has the consequence of redefining the
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meaning of existing laws. Although such changes in the
meaning of a statute can have a profound economic impact,
legislatures rarely consider it.
This Article examines the question of when this is
problematic. It begins by identifying and drawing the outline of
this previously unrecognized source of law: technology-made
law. It then focuses on one paradigmatic case: changes in the
meaning of “zero” and the closely related concept of a
mathematical limit (for example a speed limit). It defines “zero”
and demonstrates its explicit and implicit uses in law. It then
posits that there are two ways to interpret a law involving a
technological limit: a technology-static approach, in which
comparisons are made using the technology available at the
time the law was enacted, and a technology-dynamic approach,
in which comparisons are made using the technology available
at the time compliance is determined. It then sets the stage for
a comparison of these approaches by surveying the sources of
authority for making law. The approaches are then compared
using examples of the type of law which should be interpreted
under the technology-static rubric (vehicle speed limits) and
the type of law which should be interpreted under the
technology-dynamic rubric (environmental law). The analyses
are then compared so as to extract a set of principles that
should aid in resolution of the question (static or dynamic
interpretation) in other cases. Finally, it offers a generalized
theory of how problems of technology-made law can be
minimized and how they should be addressed in circumstances
where they have not been avoided.
II. Zero: Meaning and Consequence
Zero is an unusual number. Mathematically it is the
number that can be added to any other number and result in
the original number; it is the dividing line between positive and
negative numbers; it is the average of any number and its
negative.
From the perspective of daily life, it stands out from the
other natural numbers—it is rarely necessary to count how
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many of something exist where there are none. As a result, zero
is a late entrant to the world of numbers.1 Think back to grade
school and try to recall the symbol for the Roman numeral zero.
You don’t, because there is none. Early mathematicians dealt
with positive real numbers because their world experience was
limited to positive real numbers: a prehistoric hunting party
may have considered the wisdom of attacking a herd of a dozen
wooly mammoths, but it is doubtful that any considered the
question of what to do in the face of negative three wooly
mammoths.2 Without the concept of negative numbers, zero’s
role as the dividing line between positive and negative does not
arise.
Likewise, in a pre-technological society, where
measurement is done purely by human eyes, mathematical
experience deals with the world on a macro scale, so the
“nothingness” of zero makes little difference. The concept of “no
wooly mammoths” has a fixed and definite meaning. The
introduction of measurement technology changes the concept in
an important way.
“Zero” really means “below detectable limits”—in a pretechnological society “no wooly mammoths” means “no wooly
mammoths close enough to be seen or heard.” Development of a
1. Mathematically, zero serves two functions: as a number (the whole
number between -1 and +1) and as a placeholder (distinguishing 1 from 10).
Historically, there have been at least two recognitions of the numerical zero,
one developing between 400 and 300 B.C. in Babylon, developing in India,
“wending its way through northern Africa and . . . crossing into Europe via
Italy” circa 1200, the other arising independently in the New World, in
Mayan culture, likely in the first few centuries A.D. John Matson, The Origin
of
Zero,
SCI.
AM.
(Aug.
21,
2009),
available
at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=history-of-zero
(citing
CHARLES SEIFE, ZERO: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA (Viking 2000)).
Jolanta Swiderek argues that Aristotle was the first to recognize the number
zero. Jolanta Swiderek, Section Paper presented at Twentieth World
Congress of Philosophy held at Boston University: A Notion of μηδέv in the
Philosophy
of
Aristotle
(Aug.
10-15,
1998),
available
at
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciSwid.htm (“The first notion of an
abstract zero, that is a number zero, in the history of human thought
appeared in Aristotle's philosophy in the 4th c. [sic] BC . . . [t]he Philosopher
could not accepted [sic] it since it would lead him to contradiction. The basic
principles of his metaphysics demanded the rejection of this notion just as
they demanded the rejection of a notion of nothingness or actual infinity.”).
2. Arguably, it might have been important for prehistoric people to know
“no saber tooth tigers around,” but that isn’t really a counting exercise.

3

4

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

telescope changes the inquiry. Now the answer to the question
of “how many wooly mammoths are around?” depends on how
good the telescope is.3 As measurement technology improves,
the answer changes and becomes a function of the precision of
the measuring instrument. The concept of precision is implicit
in all systems of measurement, but it is not an important
consideration in early systems. Prior to the eighteenth century,
there was no international standard weight, and agreements
based on weight needed to include a definition of the reference
weight. The scientific definition of a kilogram has evolved from
the eighteenth century (the mass of a cubic decimeter of water)
to the more precise definition adopted by the General
Conference on Weights and Measures (“CGPM”) in 1889 as the
mass of a specific platinum-iridium bar maintained by the
International Bureau of Weights and Measures under
conditions specified by the 1st CGPM in 1889.4
3. Galileo faced a similar problem in 1610 when he built a telescope
which enabled him to see several of Jupiter’s moons and to observe the
phases of Venus, leading him to believe that the earth revolved around the
sun. GALILEO GALILEI, SIDEREUS NUNCIUS 28 (Peter Barker trans., Byzantium
Press 2004) (1610). This led to an inquiry by the Inquisition, which (not
having as good a telescope) concluded: “That the sun is the center of the
world and motionless is a proposition which is philosophically absurd and
false . . . ;That the earth is neither the center of the world nor motionless . . .
is philosophically equally absurd and false . . . .” MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO,
THE GALILEO AFFAIR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 288 (Maurice Finocchiaro ed.
& trans., Univ.Cal. Press, 1989).
4. Unit of Mass (Kilogram), NAT’L INST. SCI. & TECH.,
http://physics.nist.gov/cuu/Units/kilogram.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
Accuracy in measuring time has also advanced dramatically. In the late
sixteenth century, astronomer Tycho Brahe’s observatory used some of the
earliest mechanical clocks capable of displaying seconds, but the agreement
between the clocks was only plus or minus four seconds. With the advance of
the science of physics in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
ability to measure small quantities improved dramatically. By the midtwentieth, time was no longer being measured by the period of the revolution
of the earth around the sun (which varies from year to year) but was
measured using atomic transitions (the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of
the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine
levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom), with an accuracy to 10-10.
However, even atomic clocks have undergone recent redefinition to account
for the time-dilation effect of distance from the earth’s gravitational center
(1980) and to account for temperature (1997). NIST-F1 Cesium Fountain
Atomic Clock, The Primary Time and Frequency Standard for the United
Stated,
NAT’L
INST.
SCI.
&
TECH.,
http://www.nist.gov/pml/div688/grp50/primary-frequency-standards.cfm (last
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Once it is recognized that the meaning of “zero” is, in
effect, “below detectable limits”5 the legal issue becomes
apparent. A statute that uses the term zero (or a variant,
discussed below) means “so close to nothing that we can’t detect
it”—and, therefore, becomes closer and closer to mathematical
zero as the detection technology improves. As the ability to
detect improves, the legal standard changes—without the
intervention of a court or legislature.6 Moreover, there are two
types of legal zero: explicit and implicit. An example of an
explicit zero is an environmental statute which calls for “zero”
visible emissions.7 An example of an implicit zero is a speeding
statute. Although the speeding statute sets a non-zero
benchmark, this is equivalent to “zero above” the benchmark—
for example, a thirty mph speed limit translates into “zero
more than thirty mph.” Viewed this way, the use of zero in
legislation is common.
It may, at first glance, appear that it is simple to conclude
that better detection translating into tighter standards is a
good result; better detection means better enforcement and
better compliance. A few examples will illustrate why this is
not necessarily the case.
Imagine a rational legislature, attempting to balance

updated Feb. 4, 2013). Current cesium clocks are accurate to within about
one second in thirty million years. Id.
5. It follows from this definition that the meaning of “no” is “not
detectable” or, arguably, “not detected.”
6. As the ability to measure more precisely improves, the meaning of a
number changes. If it is only possible to measure in increments of .5, then a
statute or agreement requiring “1" means between .5 and 1.5—anything in
that range will be detected as “1". If a detector is developed which permits
measurement in increments of 0.1, the meaning of “1" will be narrowed to
between 0.9 and 1.1. Things that were previously permissible under the
statute or agreement have now become violative, even though the statute (or
agreement) has not changed, nor has the thing being done.
7. An example of such a statute is the standard authorized by 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (2012) and implemented by regulations published in 40 C.F.R. §
63.302 (2013). Interestingly, as discussed at infra Part IV.B, the standard
was originally based on whether emissions were observed for more than a
specified period of time by a “certified observer” (i.e., a person) but modified
as the technology became available, to allow 24/7 machine detection. In effect,
the standard was tightened without amending the regulations or providing
public notice as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See
infra Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the notice requirements.
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environmental health with economic health. After careful
analysis, it concludes that if a particular industry spends $1 on
pollution control, there will be $2 in environmental benefits,
that the industry can afford the extra $1 cost, and that this
level of control will be achieved by a statutory standard of zero
emissions of a particular pollutant. At the time, the best
available detection technology can detect one part per thousand
of the pollutant.8 After the standard is set, however, detection
technology improves so that it is now possible to detect one part
per million. In effect, the standard for control technology has
been made a thousand times more stringent. The cost of
reducing pollution to less than one part per thousand (the old
standard) was $1 and the legislature concluded this was a
reasonable cost for the anticipated benefits. Suppose, however,
that the cost to reduce the pollution to one part per million (the
new standard) is not $1 but $100. The justification for the
standard—the determination that the environmental benefit
exceeded the cost of compliance—is no longer valid.9 Instead of
a $2 benefit for every $1 spent, the statute imposes a $100 cost
for every $2 in benefit.
Imagine that the same legislature decided to build a new
superhighway. Although the cost is high, it is justified by the
time that will be saved in commuting and the economic
development that will result from expanding the area from
which people can commute. Suppose the highway engineers
report that the safe speed on the road is eighty mph and the
economics of the road project are based on travel at a constant
speed of seventy-five mph (to allow a margin of safety). At that
speed, the cost of the road is justified by a cost-benefit analysis
showing a return of 200% of the cost. When it comes time to set
the speed limit on the road, one legislator observes that people
often exceed the speed limit and assume that being a “little bit”
8. This detection level means that a company will be out of compliance
with the standard if it emits more than one molecule of the pollutant in every
thousand molecules of sample. Below that level, the company may be
emitting the pollutant but there is no way to know that.
9. If the legislature’s original determination, that the value of the
reduction was $2, is correct, then the new standard will cause $100 of
economic damage for every $2 of environmental benefit. This is not to say
that a legislature could not reach the conclusion that this is still desirable—it
is simply that the legislature has not reached that conclusion.
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over will not lead to a citation, so that to get traffic moving at
between seventy-five mph and eighty mph, the speed limit
needs to be lower than seventy-five mph. How much lower? If
the then-existing detection technology is a speedometer
calibrated in five mph increments, then a seventy mph limit is
appropriate: drivers can travel at up to seventy-five mph
without being detected as violating the limit10 and the costbenefit analysis is sound. Suppose, however, that detection
technology improves so that one mph increments can be
detected. Now traffic must move at no more than seventy-one
mph to avoid violating the speed limit.11 This would not be a
problem if the legislature had considered and approved it.
Legislatures are empowered to make cost-benefit decisions.12
However, in the absence of an examination of the issue and an
analysis of the costs and benefits of this new limit, a problem is
presented: the cost-benefit analysis that was done, under then
existing technological assumptions, is no longer valid.
Thus, better measurement technology does not always lead
to an improvement in the underlying law.
Accepting that zero13 takes on a new meaning, which

10. This is based on the simplifying assumption that the speedometer
indicator changes when the next level is reached—i.e., that when a vehicle
goes from sixty-nine mph to seventy mph, the speedometer reading goes from
sixty-five mph to seventy mph.
11. Improved detection does not necessarily lead to increased regulation.
For example, suppose a legislature wants to remove X units of a pollutant per
year, as required for example under the federal non-attainment regulations,
discussed infra Part IV.B. If the limit of detection is Y, then the standard
must be set to remove X + Y units in order to meet the requirement. If the
detection limit improves to .5Y, the limit can be lowered to X + .5Y, thus
allowing the possibility of a more relaxed standard (and presumably less
costly controls). In either case, however, if the legislation was based on a
cost/benefit analysis, that analysis will become unbalanced by virtue of the
improved detection technology.
12. "The decision whether the law of diminishing returns should have
any place in the regulation of toxic substances is quintessentially one of
legislative policy." Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 686 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). It would also likely not be a
problem if an administrative agency—for example, a state motor vehicles
administration—had made the decision pursuant to the exercise of a proper
delegation of authority.
13. The same analysis applies to any number. Zero provides a
convenient way to re-conceptualize a variety of problems so that the same
analysis can be applied. For example, a speed limit of thirty mph may be
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varies according to the ability to distinguish something from
nothing, technological advances that increase the precision of
any measurement in effect rewrite the law relating to that
which is measured. Is this an acceptable result? Laws are
changed all the time, by legislatures and courts—does it matter
if the change is, instead, wrought by a private party and is
controlled by the ingenuity of inventors and the economics of
the marketplace?
III. The Power to Make Law
A. Direct Lawmaking—Legislatures and Courts
According to classical theory, there are two ways in which
laws are created:14 legislative enactment15 and common law
judicial development.16 Both legislature-made law and judgemade law involve explicit decisions by public officials,17 both

thought of as a requirement that speed not exceed thirty mph by more than
zero.
14. See Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 119 N.E.2d 440, 443 (Ohio 1954)
(“[S]tandard of conduct . . . may be specifically established by legislative
enactment; by judicial decisions . . . ; or, in the absence of legislative
enactment or judicial decision, by a consideration . . . of the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.”); ANTHONY D’AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A
DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-41 (1984); LON FULLER,
ANATOMY OF THE LAW 59 (1968); Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures
Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 561 (1989).
There is some debate as to the scope of the power of the Executive to make
laws by treaty. See, e.g., Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization through
Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 445, 483-88 (2007). In any event, that power requires action
by at least one branch of the legislature. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I. Legislatures may delegate certain types of
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies (e.g., APA), arguably
creating a third form of lawmaking. Validly adopted agency rules have the
force of statute. W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980); Bd.
of Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124
(1981). Thus, considering agency-made law a separate category from
legislation would not change the analysis.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III.
17. While legislative laws are enacted and common law is announced, it
is convenient to use the term “post-enactment” to describe technology which
is developed after the law in question has been established—whether by
legislative enactment or judicial creation.
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are the result of a deliberative process informed by some degree
of attention to public policy, both produce public records, and
both are subject to established processes of review and,
ultimately, accountability to the public.
Legislatures and, to a greater extent courts, have
traditionally dealt with the problem of applying existing laws
to new circumstances, including circumstances which were
unforeseen at the time the law was originally created.18
In particular, past technological advances have required
interpretation and application of laws to new circumstances.
Copyright law is a good example, having faced several waves of
interpretation in response to such changes in the technology
available for copying and expressing the content of
copyrightable works. For example, when piano music rolls and
the phonograph were invented in the late nineteenth century,
courts were challenged to interpret and apply existing
copyright law to these new technologies, unforeseen at the time
the statute was enacted. Producers of music rolls and records
sold physical objects capable of reproducing sounds that
embodied works copyrighted as sheet music. In White-Smith
Music v. Apollo, the Supreme Court held that these “pianola
rolls” were not copies (within the meaning of the then-current
copyright statute) of the sheet music composition which they
reproduced and, therefore, did not infringe the author’s
copyright.19 One year later, Congress amended the copyright
statute to address the issue and provided that record
companies could embody musical compositions in pianola rolls
and records by paying a statutory fee.20
Likewise, early cable operators captured over-the-air
television broadcast signals and retransmitted them to
subscribers without compensating the owners of the copyrights
in the original broadcast. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
18. In response to the emergence of personal computers, Congress
enacted section 117 of the Copyright Act, which provided for “interim” rules
regarding copyright protection for computer software, pending further study.
More than thirty years later, section 117 remains unchanged. Courts have
been more active in resolving the issues posed by computers. 17 U.S.C. § 117
(2012); See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 19, 21-27.
19. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1908).
20. Copyright Act § 1(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412
(2012)).
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Television, Inc., the Court held that cable retransmission was
not public performance under the then-existing copyright
statute, and thus did not infringe on copyright owners’ rights.21
In Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, the Court held that cable
television’s importation of remote signals was also noninfringing.22
Another set of copyright interpretative issues arose in
connection with the advent of the new technology of
photocopiers. Publishers sued the National Institute of Health
and the National Library of Medicine for systematic
photocopying of journals they published.23 An equally divided
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims’ finding that this
constituted fair use and therefore did not infringe the
publishers’ copyrights.24
A series of cases has tested the application of existing
copyright law to the storage and transfer of files over the
internet. Courts first found that centralized file storage and
sharing violated the copyright on the stored files,25 then
reached the same conclusion, but as to decentralized
management of stored files.26 In both cases, courts found that a
substantial portion of the files involved were infringing.27
The problems dealt with in these cases, however, differ

21. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,
398-401 (1968).
22. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 410-15 (1974).
23. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1346-47
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d per curiam, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
24. Id. at 1359. While the majority in Court of Claims decision found
that this constituted fair use, the dissent characterized the ruling as “the
Dred Scott decision of copyright law.” Id. at 1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting). For
the current codification of the Fair Use Doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
25. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012-17 (9th
Cir. 2001).
26. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937-41
(2005).
27. See id. at 923 (“MGM's evidence gives reason to think that the vast
majority of users' downloads are acts of infringement . . . [meaning that] the
probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering.”); Napster, 239 F.3d
at 1012-17; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,
911 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“[V]irtually all Napster users engage in the
unauthorized downloading or uploading of copyrighted music; as much as
eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted . . .
.”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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from the problem of new technology changing the meaning of
existing law. These cases involve applying a known rule to a
new problem, a classic judicial task, even if the new problem
was one unforeseen at the time the rule was adopted. In the
case of technology-made law, the challenge is applying a known
rule to a known problem, with the complication that the
meaning of the rule itself has changed, which is of potentially
far broader impact and which poses the possibility of
disappointing settled expectations.28
In order to answer the question of whether the
introduction of private actors into the formulation of law is a
problem, one additional concept—that of delegation—needs to
be considered.
B. Delegated Lawmaking—Administrative Agencies
There is at least one category of governmental action that
arguably changes law29 and falls outside the two areas
(legislative and judicial) described above.
Legislatures frequently create administrative agencies and
delegate to them the task of developing procedures and rules
for implementing legislation. These agencies are called on to
adjudicate matters or to provide generalized guidance on the
interpretation and enforcement of statutes. This power is
constrained, however, by the Constitution30 and by the
Administrative Procedure Act31 (“APA).
28. Of course, if a legislature changed the meaning of a rule, the problem
would not arise. The issue is posed when the change in meaning takes place
outside the classic law-making process.
29. As discussed in this section, there are types of agency actions that
create rights or obligations. Presumably, however, any interpretations or
adjudications by an agency are consistent with the statute that the agency
operates under. Furthermore, in the legislation creating the agency, Congress
may place constraints on the agency, and it often “legislatively limit[s] the
factors an agency may consider.” David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, CostBenefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 82
(2005).
30. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I-III. The analysis focuses on federal
agencies. Most states have similar statutes governing state administrative
agencies.
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012).

11
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Among the provisions of the APA are requirements that an
agency give public notice of proposed rulemaking and that the
agency solicit and consider public comments on its proposed
rules.32 The APA distinguishes between agency rulemaking,
which is merely interpretative (and does not require notice and
comment),33 and that which is substantive.34 Substantive
rulemaking, which establishes rights and duties, requires
public notice, while interpretative rulemaking does not require
public participation and is merely a statement of how an
agency intends to act.35 Although the line between the two has
been described as “murky,”36 legislative rules may be thought
of as those that create new laws granting rights or imposing
obligations,37 while interpretative rules clarify existing law or
regulations, state how an agency will interpret existing law or
regulations,38 or deal with internal agency matters such as

32. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) requires that “[g]eneral notice of proposed
rule making [sic] shall be published in the Federal Register” unless affected
parties are given actual notice and that the notice include the legal authority
for the rule and the proposed rule. Interested parties must also be given the
opportunity to participate in the rule making and the agency must consider
relevant matter presented. § 553(b)(3).
33. § 553(b)(3)(A).
34. The APA does not define the distinction between substantive and
interpretative rules. Courts generally draw the distinction between rules that
clarify and those that create rights or duties. See, e.g., White v. Shalala, 7
F.3d 296, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1993); Metro. School Dist. of Wayne Twp. v. Davila,
969 F.2d 485, 488-93 (7th Cir. 1992). The Attorney General's Manual on the
APA describes substantive rules as “rules . . . issued by an agency pursuant
to statutory authority and which implement the statute,” and interpretative
rules as “rules . . . issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 30 n.3 (1947).
35. See New Jersey v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262,
1281-82 (3d Cir. 1981).
36. Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 631 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004).
37. See, e.g., SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 497-98 (3d Cir. 2005);
White, 7 F.3d at 303-04; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 92631 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Friedrich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d
829, 833-37 (6th Cir. 1990); Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d
844, 894-99 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
38. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1186-95 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Fed. Labor
Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 761-65 (3d Cir. 1992);
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 909-16 (5th Cir.
1983).
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organization.39
In addition to providing a source of information to the
agency, the requirement to follow a notice and comment
procedure when creating rights and obligations has at least two
important justifications. Such public participation introduces
an element of accountability in what is, after all, an unelected
body and comports with notions of fairness to any affected
parties by providing an opportunity to influence the agency by
making concerns known.40
If the legislature has provided the necessary power and the
agency has provided adequate public notice, delegation of law
making power is permissible. More is needed, however, to
reach the conclusion that delegation to private parties is also
permissible.
C. Technological Lawmaking—Inventors and the Marketplace
In addition to the classical mechanisms for creating law,41
there is an additional mechanism for changing law. This
mechanism emerged without fanfare in the middle of the
twentieth century and takes on increasing importance as the
pace of technological development accelerates. Advances in
technology may change the meaning of a law even though the
words of a statute remain unchanged. While there is explicit
constitutional authority for legislative enactment42 and
common law judicial development,43 there is no constitutional
39. Erringer, 371 F.3d at 630.
40. Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Constitutes “Interpretative
Rule” of Agency so as to Exempt Such Action from Notice Requirements of
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b)(3)(a)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 347,
§§ 2(a), 13(a) (1995).
41. Legislative enactments, judicially created common law, judicial
interpretation, and, arguably, delegated rulemaking by administrative
agencies are discussed supra Part III.A.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I. Legislatures may delegate certain types of
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies, arguably creating a third
form of lawmaking. See e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500
(2012). Validly adopted agency rules have the force of statute. See W. Oil &
Gas Ass’n, 633 F.2d at 807-13; Bd. of Educ., 622 F.2d at 613, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1124 (1981). Thus, considering agency-made law a separate category
from legislation would not change the analysis.
43. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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authority for private parties to make laws.44 Unlike the
classical mechanisms for changing law, this mechanism is not
dependent on the decision of a public official, need not even be
explicitly intended to change existing law, rarely results from
considerations of public policy, is not generally the subject of
published deliberations and is subject to review only in the
sense that companies respond to market failures and
legislatures have the power to amend statutes if they
determine that developments subsequent to enactment
warrant such response. Although it can have a profound
economic impact,45 legislatures rarely consider it.
Although this technological development is not overseen by
any government entity, it can have the consequence of
changing the meaning of existing laws by a process that would
not pass muster even if it were adopted by an administrative
agency. As discussed in Part III(B), an administrative agency
would, at a minimum, need to provide notice of its intended
action and consider public comments on the proposal. Further,
the administrative agency would be accountable to Congress
and therefore, at least indirectly, to the public.
Certainly, once statutes have been enacted, there is a role
for private parties. Although the government can set the rules,
independent actors can decide how to operate within those
rules. For example, in the case of federal income taxation,
Congress can establish tax rates, rules for determining taxable
income, and the dates on which taxes are due. The Internal
Revenue Service can establish rules for reporting taxes and
resolving issues in interpreting the tax code. However, the
actual amount of tax revenue collected is not determined by

44. Private parties can, of course, enter contracts (which may be thought
of as a sort of private “law”), but contracts only bind the contracting parties
and certain third party beneficiaries.
45. While national data is not available, the economic impact of the use
of speed cameras must be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year.
When the accuracy of its speed cameras forced the City of Baltimore (a city
with a population of less than a million people) to suspend their use, the city
lost $90,000 per weekday in revenues. Scott Calvert, City Gives No Restart
Data
for
Camera
Tickets,
BALT.
SUN
(June
13,
2013),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-06-13/news/bs-md-speed-cam-junemeeting-20130613_1_speed-cameras-brekford-corp-camera-tickets. Pollution
control costs are easily in the billion-dollar range each year.
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Congress46—that depends on the actions of others (how much
money taxpayers earn, how they arrange their finances, and
the general state of the economy, among others.)47
However, there are important distinctions that preclude
bringing technology-made law within the authority granted to
legislatures and courts, or within the authorization of
administrative delegation.
The most obvious distinction is that legislatures are
elected and directly accountable to the public. Judges are either
elected (in some jurisdictions) or appointed by elected officials,
and senior administrative officials are appointed by elected
officials and therefore indirectly accountable to the public.
Technology-made law is created by inventors and companies,
who are accountable (if at all) to stockholders.48
Legislators, judges and administrative agencies are not
only publicly accountable, but in most cases act in public and
create publicly accessible records. Except in rare cases,49
companies developing new technologies are under no obligation
to disclose their plans (and, in fact, generally are motivated to
keep such plans confidential).
While subject to lobbying and persuasion, legislators
presumably make decisions based on their evaluations of public
interests, while private companies generally make decisions
based on their evaluation of profit potential. Moreover,
Congress is the one body empowered to impair contracts—state

46. The amount of revenue expected is certainly a factor in setting tax
rates.
47. This constraint on legislative power is not necessarily unwelcome to
the legislature. For example, states with property taxes are able to keep the
tax rate constant while receiving rising revenue when property values rise,
and thus can raise tax revenues while claiming not to have raised taxes. See
Mark Perry, Tax Rates (%) X Tax Base = Tax Revenue ($), DAILYMARKETS
(May 17, 2011), http://www.dailymarkets.com/economy/2011/05/17/tax-ratesx-tax-base-tax-revenue.
48. It would be rare for a decision to invest in development of a new
technology to rise to the level where it would require stockholder approval.
49. Examples would include companies that are required to file reports
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and transactions
which either required stockholder approval (and therefore triggered the
SEC’s proxy rules), or which were material (and therefore required disclosure
under SEC’s reporting rules.) 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.14a-2 (2013). These
situations would be rare.
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legislatures and private individuals are constitutionally
prohibited from doing so.50
Thus, technological law making cannot be justified as an
extension of traditional law making.51 If technological law
making does not have the force of law, the question remains
how it should impact legitimate laws: how should courts use
post-enactment technological advances in deciding cases under
those enactments?
If courts use post-enactment technology in interpreting
and applying laws, then technological advances have been
incorporated in the law and the result is as though, in effect,
technology-made law rises to the same level as classical-made
law. On the other hand, ignoring technological advances may
produce less than optimal results, without any offsetting
benefit.
Given that the meaning of zero is not constant, but is a
function of available technology, how should laws setting an
explicit or implicit zero standard be interpreted?52 Two options
are available: interpret the law using the meaning of zero at
the time the law was created (technology static interpretation),
or allow the meaning of zero to evolve and apply the meaning of
zero at the time of application (technology dynamic
interpretation), in effect leaving the meaning of the law in the
hands of inventors.
Two examples will help develop a process for determining
when to ignore post-enactment technological advances and
when to consider them in interpreting and applying the law.

50. Such action by the federal government would be prohibited by U.S.
CONST. art. I § 10 and the Fifth Amendment, by a State government would be
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, and by private party would
constitute breach of contract or inducement, depending on whether the
private party was a party to the contract or not.
51. Without having conducted a survey, it would seem intuitive that
there would be general outrage if one were to propose that an anonymous
private party should have the power to make law.
52. Of course, under standard rules of interpretation, legislative intent
is relevant. Legislatures rarely consider the issue of measurement precision.
Two arguable exceptions are the fields of occupational safety and
environmental control, discussed at infra notes 77-78.
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IV. Illustrative Examples
The following examples illustrate an analytic approach
suitable for determining whether post-enactment technological
development should affect the interpretation of a law. One
would seem to lead to the conclusion that the interpretation
should be technology-static and should be based on the
technology that existed at the time the law was created. The
other would seem to be suitable for a technology-dynamic
interpretation, based on the state of technology at the time the
law is being applied to particular circumstances.
The distinctions are then distilled into a set of principles
that should govern resolution of the question (static or dynamic
interpretation) in other cases.
A. Speeding and Technology Freezing Interpretation
The technology for measuring vehicle speeds, and
determining whether a speed limit violation has taken place,
has improved dramatically in the last hundred years. Speeds
can now be measured to within tenths of a mile per hour using
inexpensive and widely available equipment. Notwithstanding
the availability of this precision measurement, the majority of
courts apply the law in a manner that acknowledges much of
the imprecision of early twentieth century measuring
techniques. While judicial justifications vary, this may be seen
as an example of a technology-static law.
In the early twentieth century, speeds were measured by a
police officer following the suspect vehicle, matching its speed,
and reading the speedometer in the officer’s car.53 The precision
of the evidence of speed depended, among other things, on the
accuracy of the police car speedometer, and tickets were rarely
issued for speeds less than five miles over the speed limit.54
53. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parish, 10 A.2d 896, 896-97 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1940) (officer followed vehicle for 1.9 miles and measured speed of sixty
mph in a fifty mph zone—statute required tracking for at least .25 mile.);
City of Spokane v. Knight, 165 P. 105, 105-06 (Wash. 1917) (motorcycle
officer followed vehicle and measured speed of twenty-seven mph to thirty
mph in a twenty mph zone).
54. United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 595 n.13 (4th Cir. 2012) (“It
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There have been two dramatic changes in speed limit
enforcement. Radar and laser technology now enable
measurement of vehicle speeds to within a fraction of a mile
per hour, and these new technologies also make their
measurements instantaneously55 rather than requiring
monitoring a vehicle over a significant distance. Furthermore,
incorporating a recording device with the speed-measuring
device allows violations to be detected without the presence of a
police officer—a remotely monitored system can operate 24/7
and detect all violations, not just those that occur in the
presence of a human observer.
Note how the definition of a speeding violation has
changed, without the intervention of a legislature or a court.
Originally, “exceeding thirty-five mph” meant “traveling at a
speed of at least forty mph, if a police officer happened to see
you, and continuing this behavior (notwithstanding the fact
that a police car was following you) for a period of several
seconds.” Now, that same language (“exceeding thirty-five
mph”) can mean “traveling at a speed of at least 35.1 mph for a
fraction of a second.”
Several states (and the federal government)56 have
explicitly addressed this, and have chosen to preserve
something of the historic meaning by statute. Florida requires
warnings for exceeding the speed limit by five mph or less
(except in school zones).57 Georgia limits citations to exceeding
is worth noting that the dissent has not cited—nor have we found—a single
case issued by any court at any time, whether state or federal, finding
probable cause exists to initiate a traffic stop for speeding on the sole basis of
an officer's unaided visual estimate that a vehicle was exceeding the speed
limit by five mph or less.”). Some states, by statute, limit the assessment of
points or grade the severity of the offense (for example, requiring that only a
warning be issued) for speeds within five or ten miles of the limit. See infra
note 55-62 and accompanying text.
55. Sticklers will complain that an instantaneous measurement is not
possible—it is just very fast compared to the pacing method—and possibly
summon Heisenberg in support of the argument that a police officer could not
specify both where the violation occurred and how fast the vehicle was going.
Such people probably should not try traffic cases.
56. The Federal Highway Administration recommends at least five mph
tolerance. See Discretionary Cooperative Agreements To Support the
Demonstration and Evaluation of Setting and Enforcing Rational Speed
Limits, 66 Fed. Reg. 29855-02 (June 1, 2001).
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 318.18(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2013).
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the speed limit by more than five mph.58 Kansas does not
assess points on a driver’s record for exceeding the speed limit
by less than ten mph where the speed limit is fifty-five to
seventy-five mph.59 Oklahoma does not assess points on a
driver’s record for exceeding the speed limit by less than ten
mph.60 Pennsylvania authorizes measuring vehicle speed by
pacing, but only if the speed is measured for at least 0.3
miles,61 and by radar and other electronic devices but only if
the speed is six mph or more in excess of the legal speed limit
(ten mph or more in an area where the legal speed limit is less
than fifty-five mph) except in school and work zones.62
Most state legislatures, however, have not addressed the
issue. While rare,63 most courts faced with the question of “how
fast is too fast” reach the same conclusion as the abovementioned states, and require a “significant” speed differential.
Though none of these decisions rest on an explicit recognition
of the technology-dynamic/technology-static issue, they are
consistent with the principle.
In Missouri, courts have affirmed a speeding conviction
based upon a fifteen mph differential64 while reversing a
speeding conviction based upon a ten mph differential,65 based
on the rationale that the results were required by “the margin
of error of accuracy within which an experienced person can
discriminate between the two speeds.”66

58. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-6-1 (LexisNexis 2013).
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1560(d)-(c) (LexisNexis 2013).
60. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-810(A) (LexisNexis 2013).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 3368(a) (West 2013).
62. § 3368(c)(4).
63. The rarity of appellate decisions regarding speeding probably has to
do with the relatively low cost of a speeding violation compared to the cost of
a trial and appeal. Many of the cases dealing with speeding involve the
question of whether there was probable cause to suspect speeding as a
predicate for a vehicle stop which led to a search and discovery of a more
serious offense.
64. See State v. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d 584, 589-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
65. See Kansas City v. Oxley, 579 S.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Mo. 1979).
66. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d at 589; see also State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188,
197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (sustaining a speeding conviction, even though there
was a question as to the accuracy of the measurement, because the radar unit
had indicated that the defendant was driving in excess of fifteen mph over
the limit).
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The Fourth Circuit has recently held that an officer’s
visual speed estimate of seventy-five mph in a seventy mph
zone did not provide probable cause to initiate a traffic stop for
speeding.67 This case was complicated by the officer’s difficulty
in explaining how he estimated speed. After reviewing the
following testimony:
Q. [Government counsel] And how many feet are
in a hundred yards?
A. [Deputy Elliott] There’s 12 [sic] feet in a yard.
Q. So 300 feet?
A. Correct.
....
THE COURT: And how many feet are in a yard?
[Deputy Elliott]: How many feet? There’s 12 [sic]
feet in a yard.
THE COURT: Well, do you know what a
yardstick is?
[Deputy Elliott]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: How many inches in a yardstick?
[Deputy Elliott]: Well, on a yardstick there’s 12
[sic] inches. Well, it depends on the yard stick
that . . . you have.68
The Fourth Circuit held that for “the district court to find that
Deputy Elliott’s ‘difficulty with measurements is immaterial to
his estimate of speed as that did not depend on time or
distance’ . . . . rings in the absurd . . . .”69
These decisions are consistent with (and arguably
influenced by) the degree of accuracy associated with human
observation of speed. Sowards explicitly makes the comparison,
citing several cases to make the point, comparing acceptable
estimations70 with unacceptable estimations.71
67. Sowards, 690 F.3d at 594..
68. Id. at 586.
69. Id. at 589.
70. Id. at 591-92; See United States v. Banks, No. 2:08-cr-19-FtM29SPC, 2008 WL 4194847, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2008) (probable cause
where officer estimated speed to be fifty to sixty mph in a thirty mph zone);
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Thus, enforcement of speed limits appears to be an
example of a technology-static law from the perspective of the
meaning of “miles per hour” in the definition of speeding.
This conclusion comports with notions of fairness and
perhaps a lingering sense that the right to confront one’s
accusers is somehow diminished when the accuser is a
machine, and a fallible machine at that.72 When the average
motorist’s speedometer is rarely tested for accuracy and may,
as in many vehicles still on the road, be an analog device with
speeds marked in five mph increments, holding that motorist
(who must divide attention between monitoring speed and
other important tasks while driving) to the current
technologically feasible standard of a fraction of a mile per hour
measured instantaneously does not seem fair, and the great
weight of authority agrees.
B. Pollution and Technology Forcing Interpretation
As with the technology for measuring vehicle speeds, the
technology for measuring emissions of pollutants has improved
dramatically in recent years. An example is the measurement
State v. Butts, 269 P.3d 862, 871-74 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (reasonable
suspicion where officer estimated speed to be forty-five mph in a thirty mph
zone); People v. Olsen, 239 N.E.2d 354, 355 (N.Y. 1968) (sustaining conviction
where officer estimated speed to be fifty to fifty-five mph in a thirty mph
zone).
71. See Oxley, 579 S.W.2d at 116 (estimate of forty-five mph speed in a
thirty-five mph zone insufficient); Olsen, 239 N.E.2d at 355 (estimate of
thirty-five to forty mph in a thirty mph zone might “for obvious reason” be
insufficient); Kimes, 234 S.W.3d at 589 (estimate of sixty mph speed in a fiftyfive mph zone insufficient, “because the accuracy of human estimation of
speed cannot easily, readily, and accurately discriminate between such small
variations in speed.”).
72. A recent audit of Baltimore’s speed camera citations disclosed one
vehicle clocked at thirty-eight mph – despite the fact that it was stopped at a
red light (as shown by the City’s own photographs) at the time. Scott Calvert,
City Issued Speed Camera Ticket to Motionless Car, BALT. SUN (Dec. 12,
2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-12-12/news/bs-md-speed-camerastopped-car-20121212_1_potential-citation-xerox-state-camera-ticket
(“The
Baltimore City speed camera ticket alleged that the four-door Mazda wagon
was going 38 miles per hour in a 25-mph zone . . . But the Mazda wasn't
speeding. It wasn't even moving. The two photos printed on the citation as
evidence of speeding show the car was idling at a red light with its brake
lights illuminated.”)
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of “visible emissions.” When the first modern environmental
laws governing visible emissions were passed, a violation
required observation by a human observer. The observer had to
be a person who had passed a certification program and had to
observe the visible emission for a specified period of time
(which varied depending on the type of facility being observed).
Thus, in order to be in violation, a facility needed not only to be
emitting a visible pollutant, but needed to be doing so in
daylight (the observer could not see the emissions at night) and
needed to be doing so when the certified observer was
present.73 Clearly this standard allowed significant visible
emissions to go undetected. Detection technology improved to
the point where mechanical sensors could be installed and
could monitor a facility twenty-four hours a day and could
detect much slighter emissions than a human observer could
see.74
In effect, this equates to a dramatic reduction in amount of
pollution without a change in the statutory language. Similar
reductions have, in effect, taken place under the Clean Air
Act,75 the Clean Water Act,76 and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act,77 all of which set technology based standards.

73. 40 C.F.R. § 63.302 (2013).
74. The technology is similar to the “electric eye,” which can
automatically open a door when someone approaches, or keep an elevator or
subway door from closing when there is a passenger in the way.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
76. The Clean Water Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act
require plants to operate at control levels achievable by the industry’s bestcontrolled plant. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012); EPA v.
Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1980) (holding that economic
considerations are inappropriate factors in setting Best Practicable
Technology standards); Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that Best Available Technology standards should be set at the level
an optimal plant can achieve); Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration could set standards that put a company out of business, if it
is deemed necessary to protect the health and safety of the company’s
workers).
77. Driesen, supra note 29, at 8.
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan, the Supreme Court addressed an industry claim
that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
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Within the Clean Air Act, Congress has set different control
technology standards that vary according to the quality of
ambient air.78 For areas in which air quality is already
acceptable, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
standards impose a requirement, known as Best Available
Control Technology (BACT), which subjects new sources of
pollution to the best control technology that is economically
feasible—”the maximum degree of reduction . . . which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into

(OSHA) must assure that the cost of standards for toxic
pollutants in the workplace bear a reasonable relationship
to the benefits such a standard provides. The Court rejected
the argument. The statutory provision at issue in the case
required OSHA to set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity .
. . . The Court concluded that Congress had already
considered cost and decided to put the health and safety of
workers above all other considerations, save that of
feasibility. The Court, relying upon a dictionary definition,
defined feasibility in terms of what one is capable of doing.
Id.
78. Commentators either see gradations in the degree of control
required, often discernible by analyzing the superlatives which Congress
used, or are guided by the tense of the verbs chosen by Congress. See Id. at
22.
Congress signals this less demanding approach to
technology-based regulation by leaving superlative words
like best, maximum, or lowest out of the statutory provision
or by qualifying the superlatives to diminish their force. A
good example of the absence of superlatives comes from the
Clean Air Act, which requires states to apply limits
achievable through application of reasonably available
control technology to major stationary sources in areas not
meeting air quality standards. The provisions for best
practicable technology effluent limits offers a good example
of qualification usually leading to laxer standards.
Id. at 14 n.77 (“Congress sometimes clearly indicates a technology-forcing
intent through employment of the future tense in articulating the feasibility
principle.”). If either of these approaches is accepted, they could be equally
applied to determining whether the statute should be viewed as technologystatic or technology-dynamic.
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account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and
other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through
application of . . . available methods . . . including . . .
innovative fuel combustion techniques . . . .”79 For areas in
which air quality is not acceptable, the standard requires that
proposed new sources meet a lowest achievable emission rate.
The term lowest achievable emission rate
[(LAER)], [which] means for any source, the rate
of emission which reflects—(A) the most
stringent emission limitation which is contained
in the implementation plan of any State for such
class or category of source, unless the owner or
operator of the proposed source demonstrates
that such limitations are not achievable, or (B)
the most stringent emission limitation which is
achieved in practice by such class or category of
source, whichever is more stringent.80
The PSD requirements “are designed to ensure that the air
quality in attainment areas or areas that are already ‘clean’
will not degrade.”81
In construing EPA’s authority to review a state agency’s
determination, the Supreme Court held that the statute
required consideration of costs in determining BACT, noting
that the statute’s purpose included “to insure that economic
growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation
of existing clean air resources.”82
The Supreme Court has observed that compliance with
environmental laws is always possible—shutting down a plant
reduces emissions to zero (by any measure, however precise).83
79. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012).
80. Id. § 7501(3).
81. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv. v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 470 (2004).
82. Id. at 485; see 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3). Although the majority and
minority both agreed on the definition of BACT, they disagreed on whether
the state had reached a rational conclusion. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv.,
540 U.S. at 502-18.
83. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 n.14 (1976). accord, AFLCIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[T]he most certain way to
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This does not translate into an inflexible requirement that
environmental laws be interpreted as technology-dynamic;
however, when coupled with a standard that is set based on a
perception of significant risk of public harm, it is a powerful
argument in that direction.
Taken together, environmental laws, unlike speeding
prosecutions, appear to be ones that should be viewed as
technology-dynamic in making determinations of violations of
environmental standards.
Several differences in the genesis and purpose of these two
categories of law justify this distinction. Using the Clean Air
Act as an example, note the following distinctions.
1. In enacting the Clean Air Act,84 Congress made the
following finding.
[T]hat the growth in the amount and complexity
of air pollution brought about by urbanization,
industrial development, and the increasing use of
motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers
to the public health and welfare, including injury
to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to
and the deterioration of property, and hazards to
air and ground transportation.85
Congress further stated that one of the purposes of the law was
“to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and
the productive capacity of its population.”86 At least some
members of Congress believed that most pollutants cause some
harm at any level.87
Therefore, an important public interest, which is
eliminate industrial hazards is to eliminate industry."). These observations
must assume that other laws, such as the Workers Notification Act, have
already been complied with—otherwise, it might be unlawful to shut down a
plant without prior notice. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (2012).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
85. Id. § 7401(a)(2).
86. Id. § 7401(b)(1).
87. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 18,463-64 (1977) (statement of Sen.
Edmund Muskie).
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established by specific scientific evidence and which would be
furthered by more stringent enforcement, is involved. In
contrast, although excessive speed is certainly dangerous, it is
hard to defend particular speed limits as anything but
arbitrary. For example, a hypothetical speed limit of twentyfive mph was probably set at that level not because twenty-six
mph would be too fast, while twenty-four mph would be too
slow but because all speed limits are set at speeds ending in “5”
or “0” (and thirty mph was thought too fast).
2. Congress has provided guidance suggesting that it
wanted to err on the side of control: in enacting the Clean Air
Act, Congress declared that its purposes included “initiat[ing]
and accelerat[ing] a national research and development
program to achieve the prevention and control of air
pollution.”88 Given its findings as to the importance of pollution
control and the adverse effects of even small amounts of
pollution, this bias seems rational. On the other hand, it would
be hard to justify the argument that a small deviation from a
speed limit would have an adverse effect. As the cases
described above appear to recognize, traveling even five or ten
miles above the speed limit, by itself, is not viewed as a serious
offense.89 Given the comparative lack of precision of automobile
speedometers, it is unimaginable that a prosecution for
traveling at 30.1 mph in a 30 mph zone would succeed.
3. The determination of environmental standards is subject
to an explicit statutory safety net. Although subject to
controversy as to its application from its inception,90 the Clean
Air Act, as well as most environmental statutes, requires a
cost/benefit analysis in setting standards. As long as a
cost/benefit analysis is made, any changes in measurement
technology that result in stricter standards will be balanced
against costs of the more stringent standard. Thus, an
88. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2) (2012).
89. See United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 595 n.13 (4th Cir. 2012).
90. See C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 235, 235 (1998) (“For years, one of the most vigorously
debated issues in regulatory reform is whether the Clean Air Act . . . should
be amended to require the Environmental Protection Agency . . . to consider
costs and benefits in setting ambient air quality standards.”). See generally
Stephen Fotis, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 127 (1985).
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accountable agency, after public notice, will be making a
decision on the record and subject to judicial review. This
process overcomes the objections to private technology-made
law.
The conclusion that environmental laws should be
interpreted as technology-dynamic, comports with notions of
fairness and, even, with the right to confront one’s accusers.
Environmental laws principally apply to corporations with
manufacturing facilities. Unlike the typical motorist,
corporations with manufacturing facilities are generally well
positioned to install their own monitoring equipment and to
check the accuracy of any findings regarding alleged violations.
They are also well positioned to monitor proposed legislative or
administrative changes and present their views as to the
appropriate level of precision in determining violations. Thus,
the elements of unfairness and unequal access to exculpatory
data which are argued, in a purely visceral way, in favor of a
technology-static approach to speeding laws, argue at the same
basic level in favor of a technology-dynamic approach to
environmental laws.
V. Principled Approach to the Problem
As noted above, there are two options available for
interpreting laws. First, there is a technology-static approach,
interpreting the law’s meaning and effect using the technology
available at the time the law was created. Second, there is a
technology-dynamic approach, interpreting the law’s meaning
and effect using the technology available at the time the law is
being applied, in effect allowing inventors to rewrite law.
The approach to the problem depends on whether the law
in question is already in effect or is under consideration. The
simpler case is that of a pending proposal for future legislation.
A. Future Legislation
Once the problem of interpretation created by advances in
measurement technology has been recognized, it can be
addressed legislatively. Future legislation should therefore
explicitly recognize the areas in which technological
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development is likely to have an effect on the meaning and
enforcement of the law.91 There are fundamentally two choices:
declare that the law is to be enforced according to the
capabilities as of the date of enactment, or that it is to be
enforced according to the best measurement technology
available at the time of enforcement. Environmental laws
provide examples of legislation where Congress has indicated
that post-enactment technological advances should be
considered.92 Note that this is not the same as the technologyforcing aspect of the environmental laws discussed above.
Those statutes were designed to encourage use of the most
current control technology. It is a different matter—and a
separate legislative determination—to decide whether also to
encourage use of the most current detection technology.
B. Existing Legislation
This leaves the much more difficult problem of existing
legislation. Where the legislature has declared a policy (as for
example the Clean Air Act), that policy should be analyzed to
determine whether it leads clearly to one approach or the
other. However, even in cases where there is legislative history,
it will not necessarily be specific to the point at issue and even
if on point will not necessarily be consistent and unambiguous
or beyond dispute.93
Where the legislature has been silent, the above two
examples suggest factors which should be considered in
determining which approach is appropriate:
1. In situations where life is at stake and the outcome will
be affected by the precision of a measurement, the law should
be interpreted using the most current available technology—it
should be technology-dynamic. This is the case with respect to
environmental laws and is not the case with respect to speed
91. This is not a radical suggestion. Congress has taken comparable
action in indexing tax brackets to account for future inflation.
92. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
93. See generally Mont. Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1979)
(observing that when legislative history contains conflicting, inconclusive
views, the court must divine the intent of Congress from the overall purpose
of the statute).
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limits
2. In situations where the state of mind of an individual is
a critical element, especially where the detection equipment
available to one party is less precise than that available to the
other, interpretation should not take into account postenactment technology unless the individual has done so—it
should be technology-static. (Speed cameras should not be more
precise than vehicle speedometers, but it is acceptable for the
EPA to use modern detection equipment that is also available
to the industry being regulated.)
3. In situations where a law is the result of a cost-benefit
analysis, the law should be frozen at the level of technology at
enactment—it should be technology-static. To employ a more
stringent standard upsets the cost-benefit analysis. While the
environmental example might superficially seem to the
contrary, it is not. Congress had made the determination that
very low levels were the goal, and provided, through delegation
to administrative agencies, the power to consider costs and
benefits under appropriate circumstances.
4. Counter intuitively, the argument in favor of tightening
standards as technology improves detection is stronger under
laws that set less precise standards. Use of an imprecise or
variable standard, as in the case of the environmental laws
discussed above, suggests that the legislature was aware of,
though perhaps not in those terms, the possibility of future
improvements in detection technology and did not want to tie
the law to contemporary limits. On the other hand, when a
legislature uses a term such as “thirty miles per hour,” it shows
no such awareness that the term may have an imprecise or
potentially changing meaning.
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